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Currently in the United States, lung transplantations are allo-
cated to candidates according to the candidates’ Lung Allocation
Score (LAS). The LAS is an ad-hoc ranking system for patients’
priorities of transplantation. The goal of this study is to develop a
framework for improving patients’ life expectancy over the LAS based
on a comprehensive modeling of the lung transplantation waiting list.
Patients and organs are modeled as arriving according to Poisson pro-
cesses, patients health status evolving a waiting time inhomogeneous
Markov process until death or transplantation, with organ recipient’s
expected post-transplant residual life depending on waiting time and
health status at transplantation. Under allocation rules satisfying
minimal fairness requirements, the long-term average expected life
converges, and its limit is a natural standard for comparing alloca-
tion strategies. Via the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, upper
bounds for the limiting average expected life are derived as a func-
tion of organ availability. Corresponding to each upper bound is an
allocable set of (time, state) pairs at which patients would be opti-
mally transplanted. The allocable set expands monotonically as organ
availability increases, which motivates the development of an alloca-
tion strategy that leads to long-term expected life close to the upper
bound. Simulation studies are conducted with model parameters esti-
mated from national lung transplantation data. Results suggest that
compared to the LAS, the proposed allocation strategy could provide
a 7% increase in average total life.
1. Introduction.
1.1. The Lung Transplantation Score (LAS). Lung transplantation was
first performed in 1963 and has evolved over the years to become a standard
treatment for patients with advanced lung diseases (Kotloff and Thabut
(2012)). There are not enough organs available for transplantation to meet
the need of patients waiting for lungs, and efficient allocation of lung trans-
plantations to patients is vital.
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2 ZOU ET AL.
Currently in the United States, patients in need of lung transplantation
are registered to waiting lists. As lungs become available for transplant,
they are allocated to candidates in waiting lists on the basis of age, ge-
ography, blood type (ABO) compatibility, and the Lung Allocation Score
(LAS). The LAS was first implemented in 2005, aiming to reduce the risk of
waiting list mortality and to prolong post-transplant residual life of organ
recipients (Valapour et al. (2017)). A patient’s LAS is computed from two
measures: the Waiting List Urgency Measure and the Post-transplant Sur-
vival Measure. The measures are, respectively, estimates of the conditional
expected number of days in the next year a candidate would survive with-
out a transplant, and the conditional expected number of days in the first
year post-transplant a candidate would survive, given the patient’s current
health status. Both waiting list and post-transplant survivals are computed
according to proportional hazards models. The expected numbers of days of
survival are calculated by integrating the areas under the covariate-specific
survival curves within the first year, under the assumption that a patient’s
health status would remain constant. The LAS is the difference between
the Post-transplant Survival Measure and twice the Waiting List Urgency
Measure, normalized to range from 0 to 100. When organs become available,
patients in the waiting list are ranked according to their LAS values. Candi-
dates with higher LAS values are given higher priorities for transplantation
(UNOS (2017)).
The LAS is recognized to be imperfect. In February 2015, the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) implemented a revision
of the LAS. Modifications were made to the covariates and their weights in
the calculation to better predict patients’ survival (Valapour et al. (2017)).
There are other concerns about the LAS besides the selection of covari-
ates. Studies have demonstrated that the emphasis on reducing the risk of
waiting list mortality in the LAS calculation may have the effect of increas-
ing post-transplant mortality, since patients with the highest LAS are often
in the worst conditions and subject to high post-transplant risk of death
(Liu et al. (2010), Russo et al. (2010, 2011), Merlo et al. (2009)). And hence
the question of whether the patients prioritized by the LAS are those who
would benefit the most from transplantation. Studies also suggested that
the LAS focused on the 1-year survival and failed to assess the long-term
benefit of lung transplantation for the recipients. Results in Maxwell et al.
(2014) showed that the 5-year survival had in fact slightly decreased after
the implementation of the LAS.
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1.2. Previous Studies on Organ Transplantation. Organ allocation has
been studied from the policy maker’s perspective. The goal is generally
characterized as assignments of organs to patients in the waiting list that
optimize expected outcomes. Early works can be traced back to Derman,
Lieberman and Ross (1971, 1975), Albright and Derman (1972) and Righter
(1989), in which the authors solved for the optimal solution for allocating
sequentially arrived resources to a finite number of subjects. The focus of
these studies was on general resource allocation problems and for this pur-
pose, the modeling was simplified and not tailored specifically to the organ
transplantation problem.
Recent studies have involved increasing model complexity in studying
the organ allocation problem. Zenios (1999) and Zenios, Wein and Chertow
(1999); Zenios, Chertow and Wein (2000) modeled the waiting list for kidney
transplantation with a deterministic fluid model: patients and organ donors
were categorized into classes based on their demographic, immunological,
and physiological characteristics and different categories of patients and or-
gans flow in and out of the waiting list at class-specific rates. An optimal
allocation rule was derived under the standard of a linear combination of
quality-adjusted life expectancy and equity. Akan et al. (2012) modeled the
waiting list for donated livers with a fluid model, in which patients were
categorized into multiple classes according to their health status. Patients
in one class were assumed to be able to flow only into adjacent categories
with deterministic rates. Optimal allocation strategies were developed un-
der a standard combining expected total number of waiting list deaths and
quality-adjusted total life expectancy.
Organ allocation had also been studied from an individual patient’s per-
spective by, for example, Ahn and Hornberger (1996), Hornberger and Ahn
(1997), Su and Zenios (2004, 2005, 2006) and Alagoz et al. (2004, 2007a,b)).
These studies focused on optimal patient strategies for accepting or rejecting
offers of organs.
Aspects of the organ transplantation problem other than organ allocation
have also been studied. For example, the impact of available cadaveric kid-
neys on the number of candidates in the waiting list (Ruth, Wyszewianski
and Herline (1985)), kidney exchange programs (Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver
(2004); Roth, So¨nmez and Utku U¨nver (2005), Ashlagi et al. (2011, 2012),
Cechla´rova´ and Lacko (2012)) and the design of policies that meet fairness
constraints chosen by the policy maker (Bertsimas, Farias and Trichakis
(2013)). In one of the few studies on lung transplantation, Vock et al. (2013)
evaluated the survival benefit of lung transplantation with the LAS from a
causal inference perspective.
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1.3. Overview of Model and Results. Relative to the richness of the lit-
erature on kidney and liver transplantation, few attempts have been made
to study organ allocation in lung transplantation. Yet models for kidney
and liver transplantation waiting lists cannot be appropriated wholesale in
the service of modeling lung transplantation as several characteristics distin-
guish the transplantation of lungs from the transplantation of other organs.
Here we propose a model for the lung transplantation waiting list based on
common characteristics shared by different organ types and on the charac-
teristics unique to lungs.
A waiting list for lung transplantation consists of patients added at ran-
dom calendar times with different characteristics such as diagnosis, demo-
graphics, and health indicators. Here patient arrivals are modeled by a calen-
dar time homogeneous Poisson process. Patients’ initial states upon arrival
are modeled as sampled randomly from a finite state space.
Patients’ states, especially their health status, may change during their
sojourn on the waiting list. As patients’ states change, their hazards for
waiting list death and expected post-transplant residual life change accord-
ingly, which in turn affect patients’ priorities for transplantation. Given the
significant implications of changes in patients’ states on allocation decisions,
it is crucial to model the trajectory of patients’ states accurately and com-
prehensively.
Here we model counterfactual patient health status trajectories, that is,
trajectories would be observed without transplantations, as independent and
identically distributed Markov processes. The model proposed here differs
from those in the previous studies, in that a patient’s health status trajectory
is indexed by the waiting time since the patient arrives, and the change in
health status is assumed to be inhomogeneous with respect to waiting time.
Waiting time since listing is an important indicator for a patient’s functional
age, which is increasingly accepted in predicting potential outcomes (Kotloff
and Thabut (2012)). The inhomogeneous assumption enables the model to
capture changes in the health status transition rate as waiting time increases.
A scenario that would benefit from the proposed modeling, for instance,
would be when patients experience accelerated deterioration in health after
waiting for a long period in a serious condition. In addition, instead of only
allowing transitions between adjacent states, the proposed model allows the
consideration of more complex patterns of transitions in patients’ health
status.
Organs, either from deceased or living donors, also become available at
random calendar times. Here organ arrivals are modeled as a homogeneous
Poisson process that is independent of patient arrivals and transitions in
LUNG TRANSPLANT ALLOCATION STRATEGIES 5
health status. When an organ becomes available, a patient in the waiting list
is selected for transplantation. Due to the short time between when an organ
becomes available and when the organ is no longer viable for transplantation,
available organs are transplanted almost instantly to the selected patient.
An organ recipient’s health status at the time of transplantation affects
the post-transplantation residual life (UNOS (2011)). Candidates who are
not transplanted will remain in the waiting list for future transplantation
opportunities. Except in rare circumstances, patients leave the waiting list
only in case of transplantation or death.
In contrast to the case of kidney and liver transplantation, living donor
transplantation is extremely rare in lung transplantation: according to UNOS
(2011), 8,674 patients were in the waiting list from year 2009 to 2011, 5,172
received deceased donor transplant and only two received living donor trans-
plant. Therefore our focus here is on deceased donor transplantation only.
Statistics in UNOS (2011) also show that from 2009 to 2011 only 20 patients
out of 5,192 refused the transplantation offer, indicating patient choice is
practically negligible in modeling lung transplantation. Therefore, we ignore
the possibility of organ refusal and focus on the policy maker’s perspective
in studying lung allocation.
The policy maker uses allocation rules to determine which patient in the
current waiting list is selected for transplantation when an organ is avail-
able. Allocation rules may make use of any information of the current state
or history of the patients in the waiting list. There are ethical issues to be
considered. Allocation rules that are not consistent over time or that are
affected by factors other than waiting times and relevant health characteris-
tics of patients might be viewed as inequitable. Relevant health characteris-
tics are those that predict outcomes by which allocation rules are compared,
such as the current and future hazards for death and/or post-transplantation
survival. Fair allocations should depend on waiting times and health charac-
teristics of the patients in the waiting list at the time of organ arrivals and
possible independent randomizations. An example of a fair allocation rule
is the first-come-first-served rule. Allocation rules obtained by defining an
index as a function of a patient’s waiting time and relevant characteristics
and allocating to the patient in the list with the highest index value (or
randomly among patients tied for the highest value) are guaranteed to be
fair.
Some standards for comparing allocation rules that have been considered
may be characterized in terms of expectations. Defining a standard in terms
of an expectation, however, does not unambiguously define an optimization
problem. Such a definition begs the question of which patients’ expectations
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are to be maximized. Implicitly, such standards refer to the long-term aver-
ages of life quantities of patients in the waiting list as time goes to infinity.
Here we take the expected total life (waiting list life plus post-transplant
life) averaged over all patients as calendar time increases as the metric for
evaluating allocation strategies. We show that under the minimal fairness
constraints, the waiting list has a unique limiting distribution. On average,
patients entering the waiting list are transplanted according to a unique
allocation-rule-specific limiting transplantation rate, which is a function of
waiting time and health status. The long-term average of patients’ total life
exists and is a functional of the limiting transplantation rate. The method
used here can be extended readily to include the long-term average of es-
sentially any aspect of patient expectation.
It is also shown that the expected proportion of transplanted patients is
bounded by the ratio of the intensity of organ arrivals to that of patient
arrivals, and that the transplantation rate satisfies boundedness constraints
related to the counterfactual transition rates. We begin the search for the op-
timal fair allocation rule by solving for the limiting waiting time and health
status specific transplantation rate that optimizes the long-term average life
subject to the boundedness constraints.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are used to characterize the form
of the optimal limiting transplantation rate. The optimal rate is nonzero
whenever the difference between the expected residual life with an immediate
transplant and the expected residual life without an immediate transplant
is greater than one minus the probability of future transplantations, scaled
by a penalty parameter associated with the ratio of organ arrival rate to
patient arrival rate.
Not every transplantation rate satisfying the constraints is a limiting rate
for some allocation strategy. In particular, the rate corresponding to the
optimal solution may not be achievable, as patients in the waiting list that
are alive and not transplanted do not necessarily include those at waiting
times and states where the optimal rate is non-zero when an organ arrives.
Here we propose an allocation strategy that is designed so that the corre-
sponding waiting time and health status specific transplantation rate is close
to the rate given by the optimal solution. The proposed allocation strategy
relies on a critical monotonicity property: as the penalty parameter asso-
ciated with organ availability decreases, combinations of waiting time and
health state become allocable with non-zero optimal transplantation rate in
a monotonic manner, and the order of each combination becoming allocable
makes a natural index of transplantation priority.
A comprehensive simulation study is conducted with model parameters
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estimated from the national lung transplantation data provided by UNOS
to examine the effect of the proposed strategy comparing to the current LAS
system. Results suggest that the proposed allocation strategy can provide a
gain of at least 7% in expected average total life relative to the LAS.
In what follows, Section 2 introduces notation in modeling the lung trans-
plantation waiting list. Section 3 characterizes the comparison of allocation
rules in terms of a constrained optimization problem and states the optimal
solution. Section 4 proposes a practical allocation strategy in terms of an
allocation index based on the optimal solution. Section 5 compares average
total life of patients with the proposed allocation strategy and the LAS in
simulation studies. Proofs of the theoretical results are postponed to the
Appendix.
2. The Waiting List. Let τ < ∞ denote the intensity of the Poisson
process of patient arrivals to the waiting list, and let 0 < T1 < T2 < . . .
denote the patients’ arrival times. For convenience, let Nt denote the number
of patient arrivals up to calender time t. Let ρ < ∞ denote the intensity
of the Poisson process of organ arrivals, and let 0 < S1 < S2 < . . . denote
the arrival times of organs. Let Ot denote the number of organ arrivals
up to calendar time t. Assume organ arrivals are independent of patient
arrivals. We are interested in settings when ρ < τ , as otherwise the supply
of organs would generally meet the demand, and there would be no need for
an allocation rule.
Let X = {0, 1, ..., n} denote the finite set of possible patient health sta-
tus, in which 0 denotes the absorbing state corresponding to death. Let
{X(s) : s ≥ 0} denote a generic health status trajectory indexed by waiting
time since arrival. Suppose X(s) is sufficiently detailed that {X(s) : s ≥ 0}
is a ca`dla`g Markov process. Denote the transition kernel of the process
by ps,t(i, j), and the infinitesimal generator by qij(s) = limt↓s(ps,t(i, j) −
I(i = j))/(t− s), where I(·) denotes the indicator function. Relative to the
granularity of measurements of patient health status, there are no patient
states that lead inevitably to sudden transitions, so it may safely be as-
sumed that the max total transition rate,
∑
j 6=i qij(s) <∞. In addition the
expected number of transitions in any finite waiting time interval is finite,
for which a sufficient condition might be
∫ T
0 qij(s)ds < ∞ for any i, j ∈ X .
Let the vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) denote the distribution of patients’ initial
states upon arrival, where pi = P (X(0) = i) for each i ∈ X . As patients
must enter the waiting list alive,
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Let T be the upper bound of
a patient’s waiting time, i.e., P (X(s) = 0) = 1 for all s ≥ T .
The effect of allocation to a patient is measured by the difference between
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the patients expected residual life with a transplant and expected residual
life without a transplant. Let R(s) denote a generic post-transplant resid-
ual life if transplantation occurs at waiting time s ≥ 0. Assume that the
characterization of patient health states is sufficiently informative such that
for any s ≥ 0, R(s) and σ({X(u) : u < s}) are conditionally independent
given X(s). Since post-transplant residual life is non-negative and bounded,
R(s) ≥ 0 and sups≥0,i∈X E (R(s) | X(s) = i) <∞.
Let {(X(k)(s), R(k)(s)) : s ≥ 0} denote the counterfactual health status
trajectories and post-transplant residual life processes of the kth arriving
patient. {(X(k)(s), R(k)(s)) : s ≥ 0, k ∈ N} are independent and identi-
cally distributed copies of the generic pair {(X(s), R(s)) : s ≥ 0}, and are
independent of {Ti, Sj : i, j ∈ N}.
An allocation sequence {aj : j = 1, 2, . . . } is a random sequence of patient
indices, where aj is the index of the recipient of the jth organ. Organs are
allocated promptly after being retrieved to keep their functionality, and the
short delay in allocation after organ arrival is omitted. For each j, Taj ≤ Sj ,
X(aj)(Sj − Taj ) 6= 0, and aj 6= ak if j 6= k, which reflects that patients who
receive transplantation must have entered the waiting list before the organ
and must be alive at the moment of allocation, and that patients exit the
waiting list upon receiving a transplant.
Let T
(k)
T denote the kth patient’s waiting time at transplantation, that
is, T
(k)
T = Sj − Tk if aj = k and T (k)T = ∞ if k /∈ {aj : j ∈ N}. Let
(n+1) denote the post-transplant state and let X0 = X ∪{n+1} denote the
augmented patient state space. Denote the kth patient’s actual trajectory
by {X˜(k)(s) : s ≥ 0}, so that
(1) X˜(k)(s) = X(k)(s) · I(s < T (k)T ) + (n+ 1) · I(s ≥ T (k)T ),
and X˜(k)(s) is a ca`dla`g process on X0.
To formulate the waiting list, we first define a filtration that describes
the information relevant to events in the waiting list up to time t, including
patient and organ arrivals, patients’ counterfactual health state transitions
and allocation decisions:
(2) Ft = σ
(
Tk, Si, ai, {X(k)(s) : s ∈ [0, t− Tk]} : Tk, Si ∈ [0, t]
)
.
At any time, the current waiting list consists of waiting time and health
status of patients who have arrived and have not died nor transplanted. Let
w0 denote the state of no patient in the list. OnW = ∪∞d=1([0, T ]×X )d∪{w0}
and its Borel σ-algebra B(W), define the waiting list process
(3) Wt = {(t− Tk, X˜(k)(t− Tk)) : Tk ≤ t, X˜(k)(t− Tk) /∈ {0, n+ 1}}.
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{Wt : t ≥ 0} is adapted to {Ft}. Since discontinuities of {Wt : t ≥ 0} can
only be a result of patient or organ arrivals or transitions in health status,
which are all ca`dla`g, Wt is ca`dla`g.
We define another filtration generated by events in the waiting list up to
time t, but excluding events associated with the allocation decision at t.
(4) Gt = σ
(
Tk, Si, {X(k)(s) : s ∈ [0, t−Tk]} : Tk, Si ∈ [0, t]
)∨σ(ai : Si < t),
Denote the waiting list before potential allocation at calendar time t by
(5)
W ′t = {(t−Tk, X(k)(t−Tk)) : Tk ≤ t, k /∈ {ai : Si < t}, X(k)(t−Tk) 6= 0}.
For any j ∈ N, Sj is a {Gt}-stopping time. Let GSj = {A : A ∩ {Sj ≤
t} ∈ Gt, ∀ t ≥ 0}, then W ′Sj is measurable with respect to GSj as W ′s is
progressively measurable.
Allocation sequences should satisfy fairness requirements. Our definition
of fairness requires that given the waiting list up to the moment of allocation,
the choice of the organ recipient should only depend on waiting time and
health status of patients who are currently alive and not transplanted, and
a randomization that is conditionally independent, given the current state
of the waiting list, of the history of the waiting list. In formal terms,
Definition 2.1. An allocation sequence {a1, a2, . . . } is termed fair, if
there exists a function Γ(·, ·), such that
1. for any x ∈ [0, T ]×X , Γ(x, ·) is a measurable function on (W,B(W)),
and for any w ∈ W\{w0}, Γ(·, w) a probability measure on {x : x ∈ w},
2. for any j ∈ N and A ∈ B(W),
(6) P ((Sj − Taj , X(aj)(Sj − Taj )) = x | GSj ) = Γ(x,W ′Sj ).
In the above definition, Γ is the allocation rule that determines the proba-
bilities of allocating an available organ to patients in the current waiting list.
Note the definition implies that given the waiting times and health status of
patients in the current waiting list, the allocation probabilities are invariant
to patient indices and consistent with respect to the calendar time.
Moreover, only realistic fair allocation rules that are non-informative of
patients’ post-transplant residual life and future events in the waiting list
are considered, and thus
(7) P ((Sj − Taj , X(aj)(Sj − Taj )) = x
|W ′Sj , {Si, Tk : i, k ∈ N}, {X(k)(s), R(k)(s) : s ≥ 0, k ∈ N})
= Γ(x,W ′Sj ).
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The effect of an allocation rule Γ is measured by the long-term average
expected total life, including life in waiting list and post-transplantation, of
all patients ever enter the waiting list. The kth patient’s total life is equal
to
(8) inf
t≥0
{X(k)(t) = 0} ∧ T (k)T +
∑
i∈X
∫ T
0
R
(k)
i (s)dN˜
(k)
i,n+1(s),
where dN˜
(k)
i,n+1(s) = 1 if T
(k)
T = s and dN˜
(k)
i,n+1(s) = 0 otherwise.
It is shown in Zou (2015) that (8) can be rewritten as
(9)
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
R˜(k)(s)dN˜
(k)
i,n+1(s) + inft≥0
{X(k)(t) = 0},
where R˜(k)(s) = R(k)(s)− ( inft≥0{X(k)(t) = 0} − s) denotes the difference
between the kth patient’s residual life with and without immediate trans-
plantation at time s. Note that the last term in (9) is invariant to allocation
rules, and therefore the expected long-term average total life is equal to the
long-term average of expected life gain from transplantation
(10) lim
t→∞
1
Nt
E
[
Ot∑
j=1
R˜(aj)(Sj − Taj )
]
,
plus a constant that is invariant to allocation rules. For simplicity of no-
tation, we will use (10) as the objective function in searching for optimal
allocation rules.
3. Optimizing the Average Expected Life Gain.
3.1. Formulation of the Optimization Problem. In studying the effect
of allocation rule Γ on the long-term average expected life gain, a pivotal
quantity is the long-term average occupancy of health state i for i ∈ X :
(11) pii(s) = lim
t→∞
1
Nt
Nt∑
k=1
I(X˜(k)(s) = i).
The long-term average of expected life gain can be expressed as a function of
the long-term occupancy, and the occupancy can be shown to satisfy certain
constraints - so that an upper bound for the long-term expected life gain
may be found by maximizing over the long-term occupancy, subject to the
constraints.
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A proof is outlined in the Appendix for the proposition that, with any
fair allocation rule, the limit in (11) exists so that pii(s) is well defined for
all i ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ]. The existence of the limit follows from the fact that
with a fair allocation rule, the waiting list process {Wt : t ≥ 0} is strong
Markov with respect to filtration {Ft} and is positive recurrent. Therefore
by the ergodic theory there exists a finite invariant measure σ and pii(s) can
be expresses in terms of σ.
For any fair allocation rule, there exists a corresponding long-term trans-
plantation rate
(12) dΨs = pis−Qsds− dpis,
where Q = {qij} is the matrix of counterfactual rate of transition in health
status. The transplantation rate is the difference between the rate of evolu-
tion that would occur absent organ allocation and the rate of the evolution
of occupancy with allocation. For s = 0, let pii(s−) = P (X(0) = i). For
achievable long-term occupancies, pii(s) is smooth. The definition may be
extended to the non-smooth case, which is relevant at the upper bound, by
taking Ψi({s}) = pii(s−)− pii(s) and allowing Ψi({s}) > 0.
The effect of an allocation rule on the long-term average of expected life
gain (10) can be expressed in terms of the long-term transplantation rate.
Let µ˜i(s) = E(R˜(s) | X(s) = i) and denote µ˜s = (µ˜1(s), . . . , µ˜n(s)). The
result is stated formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.
(13) lim
t→∞
1
Nt
E
[
Ot∑
j=1
R˜(aj)(Sj − Taj )
]
=
∫ T
0
dΨsµ˜s.
While each fair allocation rule has a corresponding transplantation rate
Ψ, not every Ψ can be traced back to an allocation rule. Ψ and pi that
correspond to fair allocation rules satisfy at least the following constraints.
First, the total allocation rate has an upper bound associated with the rate
of organ arrivals relative to the rate of patient arrivals:
(14)
∫
[0,T ]
dΨs1n ≤ ρ
τ
,
where 1n is the vector of length n in which all elements equal to 1. Essen-
tially, the left side of (14) is the limiting proportion of patients who receive
transplantation.
Second, let {·}i denote the ith element of a vector, then for all s ∈ [0, T ]
and i ∈ X ,
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Proposition 3.2. 1. pii(s) ∈ [0, pii(s−)], dpii(s) ∈ (−∞, {pis−Qsds}i],
2. Ψi({s}) ∈ [0, pii(s−)], dΨi(s) ∈ [0,∞),
3. dpii(s) ∈ [0, {pis−Qsds}i], dΨi(s) ∈ [0, {pis−Qsds}i], if pii(s−) = 0.
An upper bound for long-term average expected life is given by maximiz-
ing (13) with respect to Ψ and pi subject to (14) and Proposition 3.2.
3.2. The Optimal Allocation Rate. This section focuses on the char-
acterization of the optimal pi and Ψ that maximizes the objective while
satisfying the constraints. The primal-dual framework is used here to con-
vert the constrained primal problem to an unconstrained dual problem, in
which a penalty parameter c associated with the constraint on the limit-
ing proportion of transplanted patients is introduced. Then we apply the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations to the unconstrained problem and re-
cursively solve for the optimal transplantation rate given any value of c.
Dual-primal duality is shown for this problem so that the primal problem
is ultimately solved by finding the c corresponding to the bound in the
constraint.
Consider the unconstrained objective
(15)
∫
[0,T ]
dΨsµ˜s − c
∫
[0,T ]
dΨs1n
with a penalty parameter c ≥ 0. Denote the Ψ that maximizes (15) while
satisfying the boundedness constrains in Proposition 3.2 by Ψc. The follow-
ing result characterizes Ψc in a recursive manner.
Theorem 3.3. For all s ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ X ,
(16) Ψci ({s}) = I(ϕci (s) > c) · pii(s−)
if pii(s−) > 0, and
(17) dΨci (s) = I(ϕ
c
i (s) > c) ·
∑
j∈X
pij(s−)qji(s)ds
if pii(s−) = 0. Here
(18) ϕci (s) =
µ˜i(s)− ηci (s+)
1− γci (s+)
,
where ηci (s+) is the ith element of the vector
(19) ηc(s+) =
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) · dΛct µ˜t,
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and γci (s+) is the ith element of the vector
(20) γc(s+) =
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) · dΛct1n,
where dΛs is a diagonal matrix with dΛi(s) = dΨi(s)/pii(s−) if pii(s−) 6= 0
and Λi({s}) = dΨi(s)/{pis−dQs}i if pii(s−) = 0. The symbol P indicates
the product integral operator as defined in Gill and Johansen (1990).
Remark. Using the product integral P here enables a unified expression
of the transition probability of the Markov process, whether Ψ is absolutely
continuous or singular, or a mixture of both. For details on the application
of P to the waiting list with allocations, see Zou (2015).
Here is a heuristic interpretation of Theorem 3.3. Imagine a scenario in
which optimal allocation for a value ρ of the organ arrival rate has been in
place. The optimal allocation is characterized by dΛc where c is associated
with the allocation allowance ρ. Suppose we are now allowed an increase in
the allocation rate to ρ+dρ. Note ηci (s+) is in fact the conditional expected
life gain for a patient in state i at time s past arrival, if not transplanted im-
mediately but subject to future transplantation. γci (s+) is the corresponding
probability of future allocation. If we choose to apply our dρ of allocation
to subjects reaching state i at time s, we will further free up γci (s+)dρ more
allocation that could be applied at state i and time s, further freeing up
(γci (s+))
2dρ, . . . Ultimately, there would be a dρ/(1 − γci (s+)) increase in
allocation at state i and time s and an expected life again of µ˜i(s)− ηci (s+)
per unit of increase in allocation. This suggests that optimal allocation oc-
curs at those i and s such that
ϕci (s) =
µ˜i(s)− ηci (s+)
1− γci (s+)
is large.
4. Allocation Strategy. Theorem 3.3 suggests an upper bound of the
long-term average of the expected life gain can be achieved by allocating
organs to patients in state i at time s if and only if ϕci (s) > c, where c is
selected such that
∫
[0,T ] dΨ
c
s1n = ρ/τ .
In reality, however, this upper bound cannot be reached, as when an or-
gan is available for transplantation, there might not be any patient in the
optimal state and waiting time in the current waiting list. Since the organ
can only be preserved for a limited time before losing its functionality, the
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transplantation cannot be delayed for patients in the optimal state and wait-
ing time to appear. One of the patients available in the waiting list, though
in suboptimal states and waiting times, has to be selected for transplanta-
tion. Therefore, an allocation strategy is needed to prioritize patients in all
possible states and waiting times.
Here we propose an allocation strategy motivated by the form of the op-
timal transplantation rate. The proposed strategy are developed based on
three monotonicity results. First, the total transplantation rate is a mono-
tone function of the penalty parameter c.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose c1 > c2 ≥ 0, then
(21)
∫
[0,T ]
dΨc1s 1n ≤
∫
[0,T ]
dΨc2s 1n.
Second, the long-term average expected life gain from transplantation is
a monotone function of c.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose c1 > c2 ≥ 0, then
(22)
∫
[0,T ]
dΨc1s µ˜s ≤
∫
[0,T ]
dΨc2s µ˜s.
Third, the optimal set of state and waiting time pairs for transplantation
is monotone with respect to c. Formally, for each value of c ≥ 0, define the
corresponding allocable set
(23) Ac = {(i, s) : i ∈ X , s ∈ [0, T ], ϕci (s) > c},
which consists of state and waiting time pairs with non-zero transplantation
rate in the optimal solution given by Theorem 3.3. The following result
states that Ac expands monotonically as c decreases.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose c1 > c2 ≥ 0, then for all s ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ X ,
(24) Ac1 ⊆ Ac2 .
Based on the monotonicity results, a full order priority ranking of all
state and waiting time pairs can be obtained with Algorithm 1: Start with
a large enough value of c such that Ac = ∅, then the value of c is gradually
decreased, representing increasing organ availability, and the order in which
each state and waiting time pair enter the allocable set Ac as c decreases is
recorded. Pairs that enter the allocable set earlier are given higher priorities
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Algorithm 1 Priority Ranking for Transplantation
1: procedure Rank({(i, s) : i ∈ X , s ∈ [0, T ]})
2: Select c > 0 . Start with an arbitrary value of c
3: if Ac 6= ∅ then . Increase c to ensure Ac = ∅
4: while Ac 6= ∅ do
5: c← c+ 1
6: cu ← c; cl ← 0 . Initialize binary search
7: cprev ← c; c← (cu + cl)/2
8: for step = 1 to Nsteps do . In each step
9: while |cprev − c| > α or Ac/Acprev = ∅ do . Find largest c < cprev
10: if Ac/Acprev 6= ∅ then . s.t. Ac/Acprev 6= ∅
11: cl ← c; cprev ← c; c← (cu + cl)/2
12: else
13: cu ← c; cprev ← c; c← (cu + cl)/2
14: rank(i, s)← step for all (i, s) ∈ Ac/Acprev
15: return rank
for transplantation, as they are selected for allocation to prolong the long-
term average expected total life when the availability of organs is more
stringent and remain allocable when more organs are available.
The sensitivity parameter α in Algorithm 1 is a small positive number
needed in the algorithm to avoid infinite loops. Smaller α leads to higher
precision in ranking all waiting time and state combinations.
Once the rank of state and waiting time pairs is determined, whenever an
organ is retrieved, patients available in the current waiting list can be in-
stantly ranked based on their state and waiting time. The patient with the
highest rank will be selected for transplantation. The resulting long-term
average expected total life using this strategy is expected to be close to the
upper bound, as patients are ranked according to their potential contribu-
tions to the limiting average total life considering the limited availability
of organs. This allocation strategy satisfies the fairness requirement, as the
allocation decisions are solely determined by states and waiting times of
patients in the current list.
5. Comparison of Allocation Strategies. This section focuses on
the application of the proposed allocation strategy in the context of realistic
models for health state transitions of patients in the lung transplantation
waiting list. Waiting lists are simulated based on parameters estimated from
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) lung transplantation data,
and the proposed strategy is compared to the Lung Allocation Score (LAS)
system by its performance in extending life when applied to the simulated
waiting lists.
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The data used are the waiting list, transplant and follow-up UNOS Stan-
dard Transplant Analysis and Research files, which contain information of
heart, lung, and simultaneous heart-lung registrations and transplants that
were listed or performed in the United States and reported to the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) from October 1, 1987
to December 31, 2012. In the data, the first transplantation with the LAS
occurred on May 5, 2005. Before June 11, 2013, only patients at least 12
years of age received priority for deceased donor lung offers based on the
LAS, and thus we only include patients at least 12 years of age in the data
analysis. There were 16,049 such patients registered in the above time pe-
riod, with 129,881 records of medical measurements updated sporadically at
different times for different patients during their tenure on the waiting list.
Among the 16,049 candidates, 64.6% received transplantation, 18.4% died
while waiting in the list, and the remaining were still waiting at the end
of the study period or censored by loss of follow-up. Among patients who
received transplantation, 37.8% died and 62.2% were still alive at the end
of the study period or were censored due to loss of follow-up.
We fit two separate proportional hazards regression models with time
varying covariates to estimate the time-on-waiting-list specific hazards for
waiting list and post-transplant deaths. This serves two purposes: 1. to calcu-
late the LAS given a patient’s current covariates values and 2. to characterize
patients’ health states. Covariates in the proportional hazard regressions are
those used in the calculations in the LAS system by UNOS (for details of
covariates used in the LAS calculation, see UNOS (2017)), whenever they
are available in the data, so that no advantage is gained from an improved
variable selection when comparing the proposed strategy to the LAS. Note
in estimating the waiting list hazard for death, transplantation leads to
censoring in the data. The censoring by transplantation can be treated as
censoring at random, nevertheless, as the selection of organ recipients was
based on patients’ LAS calculated with the same covariates used in estimat-
ing the hazard for waiting list death and thus can be treated as conditionally
independent of future survivals given the observed covariates.
Here we characterize patients’ health states in terms of linear combina-
tions of the covariates, in which the coefficients of the covariates are inher-
ited from the estimates in the proportional hazards models. Table 3 and
5 in the Appendix list covariates and their estimated coefficients. Each pa-
tients’ health state at waiting time s is defined to be the pair (Swl(s), Sµ(s)),
where Swl(s) and Sµ(s) are, respectively, values of the linear combinations
of covariates at s in the proportional hazards models for waiting list and
post-transplant survivals.
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Characterizations of transitions in health states are based on observations
from exploratory analysis of the data. Covariates relevant to waiting list and
post-transplant survivals are categorized into deterministic and stochastic
variables. Deterministic variables are those remain mostly constant or are
deterministic functions of waiting time. Covariates such as age, diagnosis
group and detailed diagnosis fall into this category. Stochastic variables are
those change randomly while patients are waiting for transplants. Examples
of stochastic variables include BMI, functional assistance status, ventilation
status, creatinine, oxygen and six minute walk distance.
In the LAS calculation (UNOS (2017)), the set of the stochastic covariates
for estimating post-transplant survival is a subset of the stochastic covariates
used in estimating the waiting list survival. Therefore, the set of stochas-
tic covariates can be partitioned further into two sub-categories: covariates
used in both proportional hazards models for waiting list survival and post-
transplant survival, and covariates used only for waiting list survival. As a
result, the linear combinations Swl(s) and Sµ(s) can be written as
Swl(s) = β1 ·X1(s) + β2 ·X2(s) + β3 ·X3(s),
Sµ(s) = β˜1 ·X1(s) + β4 ·X4(s),
where X1 represents stochastic covariates included in both models, X2 rep-
resents stochastic covariates for Swl only, X3 represents deterministic covari-
ates for Swl, and X4 represents deterministic covariates for Sµ. See Tables
3 and 5 in the Appendix for detailed categorizations of the covariates into
each of the five Xs.
β1X1(s) and β2X2(s) are characterized as following conditionally inde-
pendent compound jumping processes whose jumping intensities and mag-
nitudes depend on the current waiting time and health state (Swl, Sµ). The
jumping hazards are estimated with proportional hazards regressions for re-
current events, while the jumping magnitudes (in logarithmic scale) are esti-
mated with linear regressions. It was observed from the data that estimates
of corresponding coefficients in β1 and β˜1 are approximately proportional
(Figure 1). Therefore the transition of β˜1X1(s) can be approximated by the
transition of β1X1(s) scaled by the estimate of their ratio, and vice versa.
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Fig 1. Linear Dependence Between β1X(s) and β˜1X(s)
The transition probabilities in (Swl(s), Sµ(s)) can be derived from the
transition probabilities of β1X1(s) and β2X2(s) and the deterministic tra-
jectories of β3X3(s) and β4X4(s). Specifically, for any U, V ⊂ R,
P (Swl(s+ ∆s) ∈ U, Sµ(s+ ∆s) ∈ V | Swl(s) = x, Sµ(s) = y)(25)
=
∫
V∆β4X4(s)
P (∆β2X2(s) ∈ Ul(y˜)+∆β3X3(s) | Swl(s) = x, Sµ(s) = y)
· dP (∆β˜1X1(s) = y˜ | Swl(s) = x, Sµ(s) = y),
where Vx denotes the interval V shifted by−x and l(∆β˜1X1(s)) = ∆β1X1(s)
is the linear function approximating the linear relationship between the
changes in β1X(s) and β˜1X(s), and each conditional probability in the right
side of (25) is calculated using the estimated jumping intensities and mag-
nitudes described earlier. The distribution of initial states (Swl(0), Sµ(0)) is
estimated with the empirical distribution of patients’ states upon arrival to
the waiting list.
For the purpose of efficiency in computation, we discretize waiting time
to periods of 30 days and (Swl, Sµ) to a 4 × 4 finite state space. The cor-
responding discrete transition probabilities among states are calculated by
integrating the continuous transition probabilities using the Markov prop-
erty.
We also experimented with different fineness in the discretization of wait-
ing time and health states as well as different models for transitions in health
states and simulation results were robust to different settings. See Zou (2015)
for another example in which waiting time was discretized into 90-day peri-
ods and (Swl, Sµ) was discretized into a 3× 3 state space and the transition
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probabilities of the discretized (Swl, Sµ) was estimated with a multinomial
regression model.
Given the defined health states, allocation strategies can be formulated as
priority rankings of all combinations of waiting time and health state. Here
we compare our proposed allocation strategy with the LAS and two refined
LAS-type methods. First, the LAS currently used by the UNOS is LAS =
100 · (PTAUC − 2 ·WLAUC + 730)/1095, where WLAUC is the estimated
waiting list life expectancy during an additional year and PTAUC is the
estimated post-transplant life expectancy during the first year, given the
patient’s current waiting time and state (Swl, Sµ). Patients with higher LAS
have more priorities of transplantation. Specifically, the two life expectancy
measures are calculate as follows:
WLAUC =
364∑
t=0
F¯wl(t), PTAUC =
364∑
t=0
F¯tx(t),
where F¯wl(t) is the waiting list survival function at time t (treating current
waiting time as time 0), and F¯tx(t) is the post-transplant survival function
at time t (treating time at transplant as time 0).
It is observed from the data that patients’ waiting list and post-transplant
life are usually much longer than one year. Studies showed the emphasis on
one-year survival by the LAS might have led to worse long-term survival.
See for example, Maxwell et al. (2014), for detailed statistics. Moreover, it
is implicitly assumed in the LAS calculation that the waiting list survival
functional F¯wl(t) is invariant to the patient’s current waiting time, which
may not be case. Here we also calculate a refined LAS without the one-
year constraint on the life expectancy measures and without assuming the
invariance to current waiting time. Due to heavy censoring of organ recipi-
ents with post-transplant residual life longer than five years, in the refined
LAS we calculated the median of the covariate-specific post-transplant sur-
vival, as it is less sensitive to missing values comparing to the mean, as the
post-transplant life measure.
The priority ranking of all waiting time and health state combinations in
our proposed allocation strategy is calculated with the following procedure.
Given parameters estimated from the UNOS data, for a fixed value of the
penalty parameter c, whether a combination of waiting time and health
state (Swl, Sµ) is allocable is decided by whether the optimal transplantation
rate for this combination is non-zero . Based on the monotonicity of the
allocable sets Ac (Theorem 4.3), a full order ranking of transplant priorities
for combinations of waiting times and states is obtained by comparing the
order of their appearances in Ac as c decreases as in Algorithm 1. For non-
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trivial models of transitions in (Swl, Sµ), the optimal transplantation rates
and the priority ranking of state and waiting time pairs cannot be solved
explicitly. Here we solve the optimal rates by starting from a large terminal
waiting time and calculate backwards in waiting time the optimal state for
transplantation at each waiting time interval.
See Figures 2, 3 and 4 below for a comparison of priority rankings with
the proposed allocation strategy and the two LAS-type methods. In each of
the graphs, numbers 1 − 100 floating on the gray background indicate the
discretized waiting time periods of 30 days. Each mosaic pattern under the
waiting time title contains the 4×4 state space of (Swl, Sµ), where the x-axis
indicates the states of Swl and the y-axis indicates the states of Sµ. Larger
index of the states corresponds to shorter expected life. Therefore, each small
rectangle in the graph shows the priority of a combination of waiting time
and health states, where blue indicates higher priority for transplantation,
while red indicates lower priority. For example, the rectangle on the very
top-left of Figure 2 is in deep red, demonstrating that with the proposed
allocation strategy, patients that are in the first 30-day waiting time period
and with (Swl, Sµ) = (1, 4) have very low priority of transplantation. This is
reasonable, since Swl = 1 indicates a prediction of long waiting list residual
life while Smu = 4 predicts a short post-transplant residual life, and thus
low benefit of transplantation, especially given the fact that these patients
are new to the waiting list and are less urgent in receiving transplants.
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Fig 2. Transplantation priorities of waiting time and health state combinations with the
proposed strategy
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Fig 3. Transplantation priorities of waiting time and health state combinations with the
original LAS
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Fig 4. Transplantation priorities of waiting time and health state combinations with the
refined LAS without one-year constraint and without the waiting-time-invariance assump-
tion
Finally, we simulate waiting lists with parameters estimated from the
UNOS data. Specifically, patient and organ arrivals are simulated according
to independent homogeneous Poisson processes. The organ arrival rate ρ
22 ZOU ET AL.
and the patient arrival rate τ are estimated with average numbers of patient
arrivals and organ arrivals per 30-day period after year 2006: ρˆ = 104,
τˆ = 173. At the end of each waiting time period, counterfactual transitions
in patients’ health states are simulated according to the estimated transition
probabilities. Using priority rankings of the proposed allocation strategy and
the two LAS methods, organs, whenever available, are allocated to patients
with the highest ranked combinations of waiting times and states in the
current waiting list. Patients who are not selected for transplants remain
on the waiting list with possibilities of future counterfactual transitions and
transplantations. At the end of the simulation, the total life, life in the
waiting list and post-transplant life, averaged over all patients ever entered
the waiting list, are counted in days for each of the allocation strategies.
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of averaged life out-
comes of 200 independent simulations. In each of the 200 simulation runs,
a waiting list containing 1605 patients was generated and 973 organs were
allocated to the patients with each allocation strategy. In addition to the
above mentioned strategies, we consider a random allocation strategy in
which patients are chosen for transplantation randomly, and also the pre-
sumably worst strategy in which the priority ranking is the opposite of the
proposed allocation strategy. In each simulation run, the generated waiting
list is copied five times to apply each of the allocation strategies in question.
Average Life in Wait-
ing List (SD)
Average Life Post-
Transplant (SD)
Average Total Life
(SD)
Proposed 489 (21) 1349 (20) 1839 (19)
LAS 554 (20) 1155 (15) 1708 (20)
Refined LAS 561 (21) 1162 (16) 1723 (21)
Randomized 469 (21) 1143 (30) 1612 (26)
Worst 436 (19) 1003 (21) 1440 (15)
Table 1
Means and standard deviations (SD)of averaged life outcomes (in days) with different
allocation strategies over 200 independent simulations.
By applying the proposed allocation strategy, the averaged total life in-
creased by 7.7% comparing to the result with the LAS. The gain in total
life came from a much improved post-transplant life: it increased by 16.8%
comparing to the post-transplant life under the LAS. Meanwhile, the av-
erage time in waiting list for patients (including those who never received
transplantation and the organ recipients) was shortened by 11.7%. Apply-
ing the refined LAS without the one-year constraint in the LAS calculation
and without the assumption that the waiting-list survival is invariant to the
current waiting time slightly improves the averaged total life. As expected,
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the purely random allocation had a much worse performance than the pro-
posed strategy and the LAS methods, and the “worst” strategy led to the
shortest average life among all strategies, whether it was life in waiting list
or post-transplant.
Figure 5 shows the box plots of the averaged life outcomes with each
allocation strategy. An interesting observation is that while the random-
ized strategy resulted in a larger variance, especially in post-transplant life,
which is expected given that organ recipients were selected randomly, the
mean post-transplant life of patients under the random strategy was not
substantially different from those under the LAS methods. This observation
might indicate the current LAS system still has much space to improve,
especially in extending patients’ post-transplant life.
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Fig 5. Average Life with Different Allocation Strategies
Regarding patients’ average life in the waiting list with each allocation
strategy, Table 2 and Figure 6 show detailed average waiting time for organ
recipients and patients who never received transplantation.
For patients who died while waiting for transplantation, the original LAS
with one-year constraint led to the longest in-waiting-list life, possibly due to
its emphasis on waiting list survival. The LAS gives higher priority of trans-
plantation to patients with large probability of dying within one year. With-
out the one-year constraint, the refined LAS allocated less organs to those
who are likely to die in one year without transplant and hence the shorter
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average in-waiting-list life. Overall, the LAS methods emphasize more on
the waiting list survival over the post-transplant survival.
On the other hand, the proposed strategy aims to optimize patients’ total
life and thus patients with larger expected life extension with transplantation
were given higher priority. Since some of the patients who were likely to die
in one year without transplantation were also expected to have short post-
transplant life, they were not selected as organ recipients, which resulted in
a shorter average waiting list life.
For patients who received transplantation, the proposed method short-
ened the average waiting time for an organ comparing to the LAS methods,
which might be considered to be an advantage by the clinicians and patients.
The waiting time was shorter with the original LAS comparing to the refined
LAS, which was possibly due to allocations of organs at early waiting time
to patients who were otherwise going to die soon.
Average waiting time
(Un-transplanted) (SD)
Average waiting time
(Transplanted) (SD)
Proposed 234 (14) 256 (18)
LAS 267 (14) 286 (17)
Refined LAS 242 (15) 318 (20)
Randomized 213 (17) 257 (22)
Worst 236 (15) 200 (12)
Table 2
Comparison of Average Waiting Time with Different Allocation Strategies
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Fig 6. Average Waiting Time with Different Allocation Strategies. Left: patients died in
the waiting list and never received transplants. Right: transplanted patients.
LUNG TRANSPLANT ALLOCATION STRATEGIES 25
6. Concluding Remarks. We have presented an approach to mod-
eling the lung transplantation waiting list and comparing allocation rules.
Here patient and organ arrivals are modeled as independent homogeneous
Poisson processes, and counterfactual patient health status trajectories ab-
sent transplantation are modeled as independent and identically distributed
inhomogeneous Markov processes. Patients’ expected post-transplantation
residual life depends on both the health state at the time of transplantation
and the waiting time at transplantation. The model setting here is capable
of capturing the randomness in patient and organ arrivals and the complex
dynamics of patients’ health characteristics and their effect on life outcomes.
In practice, the researchers and policy makers can always expand the state
space of patient health state so that trajectories of the transitions of health
states approximately follow the Markov property. For example, previous
medical records of patients can be included if they are believed to contain
important information for predicting future transitions.
Allocation rules are modeled as index sequences of transplanted patients.
Only fair allocation rules are considered in the comparison. Under fair al-
location rules, the choice of patients for transplantations are decided by
patients’ health states and waiting times at the time of organ arrival and
a random variable that is conditionally independent of patients’ past and
future states and survivals. Allocation probabilities are also required to be
invariant to patient index and calendar time. This definition of fairness has
two implications: first, unrealistic rules that can predict patients’ future
states and survivals are not considered; second, given patients’ health states
and waiting times, the allocation decisions are independent of other factors.
Therefore the definition of fairness here implicitly addresses the equity issue
in organ allocations.
It is shown each fair allocation rule has a corresponding limiting transplan-
tation rate. Under a fair allocation rule, the average rate of transplantation
to patients in any state and waiting time converges to the corresponding
transplantation rate as calendar time increases. The limiting transplanta-
tion rate satisfies constraints that reflect the scarcity of organs. The main
constraint is that the average proportion of transplanted patients in the
limit is bounded by the ratio of organ arrivals to that of patient arrivals.
The limiting average total life (or equivalently, the limiting average life gain
from transplantation), represented in terms of the transplantation rate, is
used as the standard in comparing fair allocation rules.
The optimal transplantation rate subject to the constraints is character-
ized recursively with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. Then a fair
allocation strategy is developed based on the form and monotonicity prop-
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erties of the optimal transplantation rate. The allocation strategy is to use
the penalty parameter c associated with the constraint on the average pro-
portion of transplanted patients as an index to prioritize patients’ states and
waiting times. The index c is related to the Gittins Index (Bertsimas and
Nin˜o-Mora (2000)). Allocating resources using Gittins index leads to opti-
mal or asymptotically optimal objectives in problems where subjects remain
static if not selected for allocations (Weber (1992), Whittle (1980), Whittle
(1988)) and in settings where the rates of patient and organ arrivals tend
to infinity. In restless bandits problems in which all subjects are constantly
in transitions, including the problem studied here, though there are suffi-
cient conditions for Gittins Index to be optimal (Bertsimas and Nin˜o-Mora
(1996), Nin˜o-Mora (2001)), the optimality is not guaranteed in general.
Simulation studies show it may be possible to improve the Lung Alloca-
tion Score (LAS) currently used by UNOS and increase the average total
life by as much as 7%. Results provided here are provisional and a deeper
understanding of the lung allocation procedure and the optimal allocation
strategy requires further effort. As discussed previously, there may be a
gap between the objective using the proposed strategy and the practical
upper bound of the objective. The gap may be a result of the lack of pa-
tients in optimal states and waiting times when organs are available, which
may stem from the fact the constraints in the optimization problem do not
cover all practical confinements on the allocations. Issues related to donor-
recipient matching, cross-region transplantation, or other practical aspects
in lung transplantation may also require further constraints to be imposed
in formulating the optimal transplantation rate and developing allocation
strategies.
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Appendix.
6.1. Coefficient Estimates for Waiting List and Post-Transplant Survivals.
Table 3. Coefficient Estimates for In-Waiting-List Hazard for Death
Covariate Group Coefficient p-value1
Age (year) 3 0.014 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Body mass index (BMI;
kg/m2)
1 0.116 × (20 -
BMI) for BMI
less than 20
kg/m2
< 2× 10−16 (***)
Ventilation status if candidate
is hospitalized
1 -0.444 if
continuous
mechanical
ventilation
needed
6.7× 10−14 (***)
Creatinine (serum, mg/dL) 1 0.220 if at least
18 years of age
< 2× 10−16 (***)
Diabetes 1 0.173 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Diagnosis Group A 3 0 NA
Diagnosis Group B 3 0.794 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Diagnosis Group C 3 1.126 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Diagnosis Group D 3 0.163 3.3× 10−4 (***)
Detailed diagnosis: Bronchiec-
tasis (Diagnosis Group A
only)
3 0.182 1.4× 10−3 (***)
Eisenmenger’s syndrome (Di-
agnosis Group B only)
3 -1.04 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Lymphangioleiomyomatosis
(Diagnosis Group A only)
3 -0.961 1.7× 10−13 (***)
Obliterative bronchiolitis (Di-
agnosis Group D only)
3 -0.416 8.3× 10−5 (***)
Pulmonary fibrosis, not idio-
pathic (Diagnosis Group D
only)
3 0.014 0.70
1Significance level: *** p-value ≤ 0.001, ** 0.001 < p-value ≤ 0.01, * 0.01 < p-value
≤ 0.05, . 0.05 < p-value ≤ 0.1.
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Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure greater than 30 mm
Hg (Diagnosis Group D only)
3 -0.44 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure of 30 mm Hg or less
(Diagnosis Group A only)
3 0.613 < 2× 10−16 (***)
Forced vital capacity (FVC) 2 0.188 × (80
- FVC)/10 if
FVC is less
than 80%
for Diagnosis
Group D
< 2× 10−16 (***)
Functional Status 1 -0.287 if no
assistance
needed with
activities of
daily living
< 2× 10−16 (***)
Oxygen needed to maintain
adequate oxygen saturation
(80% or greater) at rest
(L/min)
2 0.111 for
Group B,
0.108 for
Groups A, C,
and D
< 2× 10−16 (***)
PCO2 (mm Hg): current 1 0.222 if PCO2
is at least 40
mm Hg
< 2× 10−16 (***)
PCO2 increase of at least 15% 1 -0.232 if PCO2
increase is at
least 15%
9.4× 10−15 (***)
Pulmonary artery (PA) sys-
tolic pressure (10 mm Hg) at
rest, prior to any exercise
2 0.003 for
Group A if
the PA sys-
tolic pressure
is greater
than 40 mm
Hg, 0.016 for
Groups B, C,
and D
< 2×10−16 (***),
9.3× 10−3 (***)
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Six minute walk distance
(feet) obtained while the can-
didate is receiving supplemen-
tal oxygen required to main-
tain an oxygen saturation of
88% or greater at rest. In-
crease in supplemental oxygen
during this test is at the dis-
cretion of the center perform-
ing the test.
1 -0.075 × Six-
minute-walk
distance/100
< 2× 10−16 (***)
Table 5. Coefficient Estimates for Post-Transplantation Hazard for Death
Covariate Group Coefficient p-value2
Age (years) 4 4.4 × 10−3×
(age - 45) if
greater than
45 years of age
2.1× 10−5 (***)
Creatinine (serum) at trans-
plant (mg/dL)
1 0.177 if candi-
date is at least
18 years old
0.003 (**)
Creatinine increase of at least
150%
1 0.570 if in-
crease in
creatinine is
at least 150%,
and the higher
value deter-
mining this
increase is at
least 1 mg/dL
0.422
Ventilation status if candidate
is hospitalized
1 -0.05 if contin-
uous mechani-
cal ventilation
needed
0.710
2Significance level: *** p-value ≤ 0.001, ** 0.001 < p-value ≤ 0.01, * 0.01 < p-value
≤ 0.05, . 0.05 < p-value ≤ 0.1.
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Diagnosis Group A 4 0 NA
Diagnosis Group B 4 0.263 0.017 (*)
Diagnosis Group C 4 0.268 0.004 (**)
Diagnosis Group D 4 0.171 0.009 (**)
Detailed diagnosis: Bronchiec-
tasis (Diagnosis Group A
only)
4 0.191 0.168
Eisenmenger’s syndrome (Di-
agnosis Group B only)
4 0.745 0.297
Lymphangioleiomyomatosis
(Diagnosis Group A only)
4 -0.625 0.052 (.)
Obliterative bronchiolitis
(not-retransplant, Diagnosis
Group D only)
4 0.035 0.866
Pulmonary fibrosis, not idio-
pathic (Diagnosis Group D
only)
4 -0.150 0.077 (.)
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure greater than 30 mm
Hg (Diagnosis Group D only)
4 -0.230 0.078 (.)
Sarcoidosis with PA mean
pressure of 30 mm Hg or less
(Diagnosis Group A only)
4 -0.043 0.801
Oxygen needed to maintain
adequate oxygen saturation
(80% or greater) at rest
(L/min)
4 6.6 × 10−3
for Group A
1.1 × 10−3 for
Groups B, C,
and D
0.590, 0.845
Functional Status 1 -0.206 if no
assistance
needed with
activities of
daily living
0.001 (***)
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Six minute walk distance
(feet) obtained while the can-
didate is receiving supplemen-
tal oxygen required to main-
tain an oxygen saturation of
88% or greater at rest. In-
crease in supplemental oxygen
during this test is at the dis-
cretion of the center perform-
ing the test.
1 3.0 × 10−4×
(1200-Six
minute walk
distance), 0
if six-minute-
distance-
walked is at
least 1200 feet
6.2× 10−10 (***)
6.2. Proofs of Main Technical Results. Here we outline the proofs of
selected main results. For detailed proofs of all technical results, see Zou
(2015).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. For any i ∈ X , Ψi can be decomposed into (c.f. for example
Halmos (1974)),
Ψi = Ψ
ac
i + Ψ
s
i ,
where Ψaci is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure
with density ψi and Ψ
s
i is singular to the Lebesgue measure with support B.
Define the value function
(26) Vs−(pi) = sup
{Ψt:s≤t≤T}
{∫
[s,T ]
dΨt · (µ˜t − c · 1n)
}
Where dΨt = pit−dQt − dpit, pis− = pi and pit = pi ·P[s,t](I + dQ)(I − dΛ)
for any t ∈ [s, T ].
By the dynamic programming principle (see, for example, Fleming and
Soner (2006)), for all s ∈ [0, T ] and ∆s > 0,
Vs−(pi) = sup
{Ψt:s≤t<s+∆s}
{
V(s+∆s)−(pi(s+∆s)−)
+
∫
[s,s+∆s)
(dΨac(t) + dΨs(t)) · (µ˜t − c · 1n)
}
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which leads to
sup
{Ψt:s≤t<s+∆s}
{
V(s+∆s)−(pi(s+∆s)−)− Vs−(pis−)
∆s
+
1
∆s
∫
[s,s+∆s)
(dΨac(t) + dΨs(t)) · (µ˜t − c · 1n)
}
= 0.
If s /∈ B, ∫{s} dΨsi (u) = 0 for all i ∈ X , and the Radon-Nikodym derivative
ψi exists at s, in which case the value function is a solution to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations
(27)
∂V
∂s
+ sup
{Ψt:s≤t<s+∆s}
{ψsµ˜s − c ·ψs1n +
∂V
∂pi
· dpi
ds
} = 0,
where
∂V
∂pi
=
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ) · dΛt · (µ˜t − c1n)
as pit−(I + dQt)dΛt = dΨt and pit− = pi ·P[s,t)(I + dQ)(I − dΛ), and
dpi
ds
= pis− · qs −ψs.
If s is an atomic point of Ψi, then pii(s−) > 0, and letting ∆s→ 0 leads
to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
Vs−(pi) = sup
Λ({s})
{Vs(pi(I −Λ({s}))) + piΛ({s})(µ˜s − c · 1n)}
= sup
Λ({s})
{
piΛ({s}) · (µ˜s − c · 1n)
+
∫
(s,T ]
pi ·R
[s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛ) · dΛt · (µ˜t − c · 1n)
}
,(28)
where Λ({s}) satisfies
0 ≤ piΛ({s}) ≤ pi.
We claim that if a function V satisfies (27) and (28), depending on whether
Ψ is absolutely continuous or singular to Lebesgue measure at s, then V is
the value function as defined in (26) for all waiting time s ∈ [0, T ] and
distribution pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) of initial states. To show this, we first prove V
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is an upper bound of the value function. Since
V(s+∆s)−(pi(s+∆s)−) = V (s−,pis−)
+
∫
[s,s+∆s)∩Bc
(
∂V
∂s
+
∂V
∂pi
· dpi
ds
)
ds
+
∑
u∈[s,s+∆s)∩B
(V (u,piu)− V (u−,piu−)),
with (27) and (28), the left side of the above equation is no greater than
V (s−,pis−)−
∫
[s,s+∆s)
(dΨact + dΨ
s
t ) · (µ˜t − c · 1n)
with any Ψ. Letting s+ ∆s = T leads to
(29) V (s−,pis−) ≥
∫
[s,T )
(dΨac(t) + dΨs(t)) · (µ˜t − c · 1n),
which verifies that V is an upper bound of the value function.
Now we show the equality can be achieved in (29) by providing the solu-
tion form of Ψ leading to V that satisfies (27) and (28), and conclude that
V is indeed the value function.
From the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (27),
− ∂V
∂s
= sup
{Ψt:s≤t<s+∆s}
{(µ˜s − γc(s+)ηc(s+)− c (1n − γc(s+)) ·ψs
+ (γc(s+)ηc(s+)− cγc(s+)) · pi(s−) · q(s)},
and the supremum on the right side is obtained by taking
(30)
ψci (s) =

∞, if µ˜i(s)−γci (s+)ηci (s+)1−γci (s+) > c and pix(s−) > 0,∑
x∈X pix(s−)qx,i(s), if µ˜i(s)−γ
c
i (s+)η
c
i (s+)
1−γci (s+) > c and pix(s−) = 0,
0, if
µ˜i(s)−γci (s+)ηci (s+)
1−γci (s+) ≤ c.
Note the function in the supremum of (28) is a linear functional of Λ with
coefficient
µ˜s − γc(s+)ηc(s+)− c (1n − γc(s+)),
indicating the optimal Λc at any s ∈ [0, T ] should satisfy
(31) Λc({s}) = I(ϕc(s) > c).
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Combining the absolutely continuous and singular solutions (30) and (31)
proves the desired solution form.
Finally, we show {γc(s+)ηc(s+)}i is indeed the expected life gain after
waiting time s if the occupancy is concentrated in state i at s− and none
is transplanted at s. Let ei denote the n-dimensional vector with the ith
element being 1 and all other elements being 0, then
{γc(s+)ηc(s+)}i = ei ·
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) · dΛct · µ˜t.
Since for any t ∈ (s, T ], ei ·P(s,t)(I + dQ)(I − dΛc) is the limiting average
occupancy at waiting time t− if started from full occupancy of state i at s−
and if none is transplanted at s, we have the desired result. The result for
{γc(s+)}i can be shown similarly.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
Proof. By (18), it suffices to show that for all s ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ X ,
{µ˜s − c11n}i > {γc1(s+)ηc1(s+)− c1γc1(s+)}i
is a sufficient condition for
{µ˜s − c21n}i > {γc2(s+)ηc2(s+)− c2γc2(s+)}i,
where {·}i indicates the ith element of the vector, and γc1(s+) and ηc1(s+)
are defined as in (19) and (20). Note for j = 1, 2,
{γcj (s+)ηcj (s+)− cjγcj (s+)}i
= ei ·
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛcj ) · dΛcj (t) · (µ˜t − cj · 1n),
where {Λcj (t) : t ∈ (s, T ]} are characterized in (16) and (17).
A key observation is that for any s ∈ [0, T ], the form of {Λcj (t) : t ∈ (s, T ]}
is independent of the initial condition pis. Therefore for any i ∈ X and
s ∈ [0, T ], {Λcj (t) : t ∈ (s, T ]} also maximizes the objective under penalty
parameter cj as if only waiting time greater than s is considered, and all of
the occupancy is concentrated at state i at initial time s:
ei ·
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛcj ) · dΛcj (t) · (µ˜t − cj · 1n),
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which gives
{γc1(s+)ηc1(s+)− c1γc1(s+)}i
≥ ei ·
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc2) · dΛc2(t) · (µ˜t − c1 · 1n).
Subtracting {γc2(s+)ηc2(s+)− c2γc2(s+)}i from both sides gives
{γc1(s+)ηc1(s+)− c1γc1(s+)}i − {γc2(s+)ηc2(s+)− c2γc2(s+)}i
≥ ei ·
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc2) · dΛc2(t) · (c2 · 1n − c1 · 1n).
The term on the right side is no less than c2− c1 as the probability of future
transplantation
ei ·
∫
(s,T ] R(s,t)
(I + dQ)(I − dΛc2) · dΛc2(t) · 1n ≤ 1,
therefore
γc1(s+)ηc1(s+) + c1(1n − γc1(s+)) ≥ γc2(s+)ηc2(s+) + c2(1n − γc2(s+)),
and the desired result follows.
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